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DOMESTIC BONDS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES, AND THE NEXT
TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
ANNA GELPERN∗

INTRODUCTION: BIG CHANGE
Not long ago, rich countries borrowed freely in their own currencies
and under their own law. Most had deep and liquid financial markets where
both local and foreign residents invested their savings. Unlike poor and
middle-income countries, the rich rarely worried about losing access to
credit. Conventional wisdom attributed this to some combination of creditworthiness and institutional quality: stable currencies; sound fiscal and
monetary policies; trustworthy legal systems; and deep, open, and wellregulated financial markets that encouraged innovation.1
The emerging markets—poor and middle-income countries raising
money internationally2—occupied an exotic corner of the financial uni∗ Rutgers University School of Law–Newark. The author is grateful to the organizers and
participants in this symposium, the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association, a workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Christopher H. Browne Center for International
Politics, and to Robert Ahdieh, Femi Austin, Ed Bartholomew, Tom Callaghy, Philip G. Cerny, GuyLaine Charles, Kevin Davis, Giselle Datz, Adam Feibelman, Mitu Gulati, Melissa Jacoby, Sky Julian,
Chris Kushlis, Thomas Laryea, Michael Likosky, Mark Milford, Frank Partnoy, Matt Tubin, Brad
Setser, David Skeel, and Mark Weidemaier for helpful comments and insights, and to the Dean’s Fund
at Rutgers Law School for financial support.
1. See e.g., MORRIS GOLDSTEIN & PHILIP TURNER, CONTROLLING CURRENCY MISMATCHES IN
EMERGING MARKETS 77–78 (2004); John Williamson, From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name:
A Short History of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions for What to Do Next, FIN. & DEV., Sept.
2003, at 10, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/09/pdf/williams.pdf. For
critical perspectives, see generally THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
2. The Economist, Economics A–Z, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.
cfm?LETTER=E (follow “Emerging Markets” hyperlink; then follow “Developing Countries” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); see Ashoka Mody, What Is an Emerging Market?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L.
641, 641–43 (2004) (providing a sampling of popular definitions and proposing new defining criteria
for the emerging markets); The World Bank, Country Classification, http://www.worldbank.org/
datastatistics (follow “Country Classification” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) (“Economies are
divided according to 2006 GNI per capita . . . . The groups are: low income, $905 or less; lower middle
income, $906–$3,595; upper middle income, $3,596–$11,115; and high income, $11,116 or more.”).
Poor countries were often excluded from the term “emerging markets” for lack of market access. As
these countries have begun to attract international portfolio capital, commentators have begun to distinguish between the more established, mostly middle-income “emerging” and recently arrived, mostly
low-income “frontier” markets. For purposes of this essay, the salient distinction is between highincome countries like the United States and Japan, and all others to the extent they borrow internation147
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verse. Barely two dozen had sustained access to foreign private capital.3
Those that could borrow abroad had to do so in foreign currency and under
foreign law.4 Domestic credit markets were nonexistent or small, shallow,
and closed to foreigners.5 Emerging economies suffered from frequent
shocks and volatile asset prices, which rarely correlated with prices in New
York or London. Conventional wisdom attributed this to some combination
of low creditworthiness and poor institutional quality.6 Politics stood perennially in the way of emergence: the legacy of foreign financial exploitation cast a long shadow;7 domestic pressures drove dubious borrowing and
default.8
Writing about emerging market debt meant writing about the Big
Change: the shift in governments’ foreign borrowing from bank loans in
the 1970s to tradable bonds in the 1990s.9 Lawyers and economists ex-

ally. The term “emerging” here refers to “all others,” recognizing that not all observations hold with
equal strength for all countries.
3. See GLORIA M. KIM, J. P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., EMERGING MARKETS BOND INDEX PLUS
(EMBI+): RULES AND METHODOLOGY 1–2 (2004), available at http://200.32.4.58/~economia/
moneda/EMBI_.pdf; GLORIA M. KIM, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., EMBI GLOBAL AND EMBI
GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED: RULES AND METHODOLOGY 1–2 (2004) [hereinafter KIM, EMBI GLOBAL AND
EMBI GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED] (on file with author); JOYCE CHANG ET AL., J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES
LTD., EMERGING MARKETS EVOLVE AS AN ASSET CLASS 4 (2007) (on file with author).
4. Economic literature refers to countries’ inability to borrow in their own currency as the Original Sin. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, Currency Mismatches, Debt
Intolerance and Original Sin: Why They Are Not the Same and Why It Matters 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10036, 2003), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/
~rhausma/NBER/10036.pdf. On governing law, see, for example, LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO
NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 132 (2000) (“Some sovereign borrowers are prohibited by their constitutions from signing a contract governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction. These
sovereigns are notable for their infrequent appearances in the Euromarkets.”).
5. See Frank Packer, Mind the Gap: Domestic Versus Foreign Currency Sovereign Ratings, BIS
Q. REV., Sept. 2003, at 55–56, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0309.htm; Philip D.
Wooldridge et al., Changing Links Between Mature and Emerging Financial Markets, BIS Q. REV.,
Sept. 2003, at 45–47, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0309.htm.
6. See sources cited supra note 1.
7. See, for example, Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private
Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699,
705–21 (2007), for a historical overview of politics driving private lending to Latin American sovereigns.
8. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 316–26 (2005) (arguing that Argentina’s default in 2001 was
opportunistic); Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 12
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 465 (2006) (arguing that the depth of Argentina’s last financial crisis was due in
part to the political system’s inability to pursue policies consistent with its currency regime or abandon
the regime).
9. Many articles and conferences highlighted the shift. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, A Quarter
Century of Sovereign Debt Management: An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637 (2004) (first in a series
of essays in this issue that address the shift); Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View
From the Legal Academy, 53 EMORY L.J. 657 (2004); Symposium on New Bankruptcy Arrangements
for Sovereign Debt, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 229 (2002); Symposium, The New Latin
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pected the shift to bring about collective action problems when countries
hit financial distress. A cash-strapped sovereign with bonded debt might
fail to persuade enough creditors to give it debt relief, leading to protracted
economic decline. Such problems called for contractual or statutory analogues to domestic bankruptcy.10
Both the loans and the bonds at the center of this literature were denominated in foreign currency, governed by foreign (usually New York or
English) law, and presumptively held by foreign residents. But the incident
that jump-started the policy response to collective action problems, Mexico’s “Tequila” crisis in 1994–95, centered on tesobonos—Mexican-law
treasury instruments denominated in pesos and indexed to the U.S. dollar.11
Some tesobonos were held by foreigners, but most were not. The fact that
tesobonos were domestic bonds was completely overshadowed by the fact
that they were bonds, and bonds were bad news.12
Domestic debt in poor and middle-income countries grew over the
next decade; all the while the world debated how to amend New York- and
American Debt Regime, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 5 (1995); Symposium, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177 (2005).
10. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY
WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995) (an influential proposal for improving sovereign workouts, advocating contract reform); Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Early Ideas on Sovereign
Bankruptcy Reorganization: A Survey (Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF] Working Paper, Paper No. 02/57,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=879533 (providing an overview of academic proposals for a
sovereign bankruptcy regime). Recently, the two alternatives were associated with their leading policy
proponents, economists John Taylor and Anne Krueger. See John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury
for Int’l Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Speech at the Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards, Institute for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=455 (on contracts); Anne O.
Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir. of the IMF, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
An Update on Our Thinking, Speech at the Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards, Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=454 (on bankruptcy). For background on the last round of initiatives, see
Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1627 (2006) (on contracts), and Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign
Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299 (2005) (on bankruptcy).
11. For a discussion of tesobonos in the context of Mexico’s public debt management, see, for
example, United Mex. States, Annual Report (Form 18-K), Exhibit D: Current United Mexican States
Description, at D-79 to D-80 (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
101368/000095012302009762/y64564exv99wd.htm; MEXICO 1994: ANATOMY OF AN EMERGINGMARKET CRASH (Sebastian Edwards & Moisés Naím eds., 1997) (a collection of essays on the causes
and implications of the Tequila crisis), and GOLDSTEIN & TURNER, supra note 1, at 12–13, 14 tbl.2.2
(describing the role of tesobonos in the crisis). For a contemporary emerging market reaction, see, for
example, Melike Altinkemer, Problems with Issuing Foreign Currency and Foreign Indexed Bonds in
the Light of Mexican Experience (The Cent. Bank of the Republic of Turk., Discussion Paper No. 9617,
1996), available at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/research/discus/dpaper17.html.
12. See generally EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 10, at 28–30, 48 (citing Rory Macmillan,
Personal View: New Lease of Life for Bondholder Councils, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 1995, at
11) (in response to the Mexican crisis, stressing coordination problems in bonded debt and proposing to
establish analogues to early twentieth-century foreign bondholder committees).
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English-law bonds held by foreigners. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the outstanding stock of domestic bonds in these
countries went from one trillion dollars in 1995 to over four trillion dollars
in 2006, with public sector borrowing close to three-quarters of the new
total.13 In Mexico, domestic government debt went from just over twenty
percent of total debt stock in 1995 to nearly eighty percent in 2007.14 This
rise in domestic debt went hand in hand with innovations in risk management. In the emerging markets, credit derivatives—contracts to transfer
credit risk among market participants—grew from zero in the mid-1990s to
roughly three hundred billion dollars in 2005, surpassing the market capitalization of the leading bond index at the time, and projected to double
annually.15
A shift from foreign to domestic borrowing and the rise of new risk
transfer tools on such a vast scale portend fundamental change for many
countries—reducing vulnerability to currency crises, multiplying debt
management options for governments, developing domestic financial markets, and expanding access to credit.16 For those who see direct links between investor interest and institutional quality, the shift could signal new
trust in emerging market institutions, from legal infrastructure to exchange
rate regimes. The shift makes the emerging economies look more like “mature” rich ones, with their deep domestic markets and rapid financial innovation.
Yet since there is no single agreed upon definition of “domestic debt,”
the scope and significance of the shift are unclear.17 Change is measured by
13. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, FINANCIAL STABILITY
LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS 2, 3 fig.A1, 57 (2007), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cgfs28.pdf [hereinafter CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS].
14. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, United Mex. States, Outstanding Federal Government Debt, http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/clon_estadisticas/english/html/mensual.html (follow
“Public Debt” hyperlink; toggle to “Advanced” radio button; select December 1995 or August 2007
under “Period,” then follow “Outstanding Federal Government Debt” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26,
2007).
15. The total refers to notional amounts outstanding. B. GERARD DAGES, DAMON PALMER &
SHAD TURNEY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGING MARKET CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKET 3 (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny4.pdf. J.P. Morgan’s
EMBI Global tracks dollar-denominated debt securities issued by emerging market governments under
foreign law. KIM, EMBI GLOBAL AND EMBI GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED, supra note 3, at 1. Until recently, it
was considered to be the benchmark for emerging market debt as an asset class.
16. See, e.g., Group of Eight, G8 Action Plan for Developing Local Bond Markets in Emerging
Market Economies and Developing Countries (May 19, 2007), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
finance/g8finance-bond.pdf [hereinafter G8 Action Plan].
17. This is partly due to the difficulty of gathering statistics in new and diverse institutional settings. Fin. Stability Forum, Working Group on Capital Flows, Report of the Working Group on Capital
Flows, 43–48 (Apr. 5, 2000), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/Capital_flows00.pdf;
CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 4, 89–90; G8 Action Plan, supra note
16, at 2.
AND
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proxy as growth in local-currency,18 locally-held,19 locally-issued,20 or
local-law21 debt. To be sure, all of the above grew, but not necessarily in
tandem. And the tools designed to manage credit risk in the mainstream
markets often cannot do the same in the emerging ones. Assessing change
thus requires unpacking its different dimensions to reveal the legal and
currency regimes, actors, instruments, and risk-shifting strategies that make
up the new financial landscape in the emerging markets.
This symposium contribution examines four such dimensions—
governing law, currency of denomination, identity of the creditors, and
credit risk transfer—focusing on the implications for emerging market
sovereign debt. Government debt is a sensible starting point for studying
change because it still dwarfs private debt in poor and middle-income
countries. Although domestic corporate issuance is substantial in some
parts of the emerging world and rising fast in many more, to the extent
there is a story of large-scale transformation, it is most apparent with sovereigns.
Parsing recent sovereign borrowing in this way reveals a partial convergence between emerging and mainstream markets. The two may share
investors and use similar financial instruments, but this formal resemblance
does not necessarily stand for substantive identity. Instead, investors use
similar instruments differently in different markets, which, as some of the
examples in the text suggest, can be a new source of risk. The image of
“emergence” as a linear march to an ideal of market “maturity” (“development” rebranded) can obscure more than it reveals.
Law scholars played a central role in addressing the shift from bank
loans to tradable bonds in the 1990s, but have yet to engage with the rise of
domestic debt and credit derivatives in the emerging markets. The goal of
this essay is not to offer the definitive analytical framework or policy prescription, but to map the ongoing transformation in a way that highlights
gaps between formal and substantive convergence and indicates potential
directions for future research.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD G. BENNETT, SHAKU PITHAVADIAN, GLORIA M. KIM & JENNIE BYUN, J.P.
MORGAN SECURITIES INC., INTRODUCING THE JPMORGAN GOVERNMENT BOND INDEX-EMERGING
MARKETS (GBI-EM) 1 (2006) (on file with author); Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel & Sergio L.
Schmukler, Government Bonds in Domestic and Foreign Currency: the Role of Institutional and Macroeconomic Factors, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 370, 372 (2007) (emphasizing currency of denomination
over place of issuance).
19. See, e.g., IMF, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL ¶¶ 13, 21, 57–64 (5th ed. 1993).
20. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 18, 112; Olivier Jeanne &
Anastasia Guscina, Government Debt in Emerging Market Countries: A New Data Set 6 (IMF Working
Paper, Paper No. 06/98, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0698.pdf
(emphasizing place of issuance over residence of the holder).
21. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 18, 112.
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The next section elaborates on the context for the transformation. Section II then examines four dimensions of change. Starting with governing
law, it suggests that, contrary to popular perceptions, the rise of local-law
debt may increase uncertainty about crisis resolution. Second, it notes that
risk-sharing features often presumed to inhere in local-currency debt are
easy to vary by contract, and that such variations were at the center of several recent crises. Third, it argues that the new diversity, mixing, and
churning of creditors to emerging market governments may narrow the
space for preemptive debt restructuring and may shrink the authorities’
options in crisis. Credit risk transfer can exacerbate this effect. In addition,
credit derivatives on emerging market sovereign debt have featured disproportionately in recent lawsuits and have helped shape the law governing the
broader, multi-trillion dollar derivatives market. This essay concludes with
implications for governance, risk management, and research.
I.

ALMOST MAINSTREAM

In the emerging markets of the 1980s and 90s, creditors, borrowers,
and instruments were segmented. Foreigners and local residents rarely held
the same claims. Foreigners usually lent foreign currency under foreignlaw contracts; locals lent local currency under local law.22 These divisions
seemed especially stark since risk stayed with the creditors advancing the
cash: the emerging markets lacked the risk transfer machinery that was
reshaping mainstream finance.23
Segmentation had two sets of pragmatic and analytical consequences.
First, it made sense for academics and policymakers to treat emerging market financial vulnerabilities in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the sovereign bankruptcy proposal advanced by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 2001 addressed only sovereign bonds governed by foreign law.24

22. Dollarized economies are an important but partial exception to the pattern of local residents
holding local-currency claims. See Anne-Marie Gulde et al., Dealing with Banking Crises in Dollarized
Economies, in INT’L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 217, MANAGING FINANCIAL CRISES:
RECENT EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA 54 (Charles Collyns & G. Russell Kincaid
eds., 2003).
23. See Frank Packer & Chamaree Suthiphongchai, Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, BIS Q. REV.,
Dec. 2003, at 79, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0312g.pdf; DAGES ET AL., supra note
15. See generally FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003) (describing the emergence of complex risk transfer techniques in the
mainstream markets).
24. See Hagan, supra note 10, at 350–52.
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Governments were expected to sort out local debts on their own by changing the law, printing more currency, or squeezing local lenders.25
Second, segmentation meant that those who worried about financial
stability in the mainstream markets could safely ignore the emerging ones,
except when mainstream institutions got mixed up there. The Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s threatened the health of large U.S. banks, which
occasioned the Baker and Brady plans.26 Russia’s 1998 debt default
brought down a Connecticut hedge fund, which threatened to bring down
Wall Street, which in turn called for a Fed-orchestrated bailout.27 Such
exceptions aside, the emerging markets stood apart: actors, instruments,
incentives, and the institutional rescue machinery (notably the IMF)28 were
distinct from, unlike, and essentially irrelevant to the mainstream. Emergence was at once a path to the mainstream and a way of denoting the distance between here and there.
The gap between emerging and mainstream financial markets began to
narrow in the 1990s, but it took years for change to become visible. Financial liberalization early in the decade brought foreigners into the local markets (such as they were) and let locals invest abroad. A wave of crises
halted the trend, but it resumed in the early 2000s. After the crises, governments in poor and middle-income countries focused on saving money.
Their savings helped produce a surfeit of global capital,29 which in turn
supported the governments’ efforts to cultivate domestic markets to guard
against future shocks.
By 2005, investors faced a new world: money was cheap, lending to
the mainstream paid little, and default looked remote even for the most
marginal states. What little risk remained seemed easy to diffuse with financial technology, such as forward currency and credit derivative contracts. Emerging markets as an asset class shifted away from foreign law

25. Id.; IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 12–
19 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/081402.htm.
26. See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading
from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802, 1802–15 (1998).
27. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2000); PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING chs. 9, 11 (2001) (on the Russian Crisis and
the Long-Term Capital Management rescue); THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–
13 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf. Of course, Russia’s
crisis also raised security concerns apart from its effect on mainstream market institutions.
28. The last G7 country to borrow from the IMF was the United Kingdom, in 1977. JAMES M.
BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1979–1989, at 180 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Governor Ben S. Bernanke, The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account
Deficit, Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/default.htm.
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and foreign currency to local law and local currency.30 If the United States
could sell dollar-denominated treasuries to foreigners,31 Brazil could now
sell them bonds denominated in reais.32 Convergence was nigh.
II. DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE
The developments described in the preceding passage get credit for
improving sovereign debt management flexibility and deepening local capital markets—both important milestones in emergence. Using one economist’s metric, the shift to domestic borrowing looks like a shift from
transactional (emerging) to institutional (mature) commitment strategies:
investors no longer demand to be paid dollars in New York but rather seem
to rely on the borrower’s own institutions for managing its currency and
enforcing its contracts.33 To find out the extent to which the shift from
transactional to institutional commitment has in fact taken place, and
whether it translates into less risk for sovereigns, their lenders, and the
system, this section unpacks different dimensions of change. It examines
governing law, currency of denomination, creditor identity, and credit risk
transfer, asking what has changed and why it matters.
A.

Governing Law

The choice of foreign law to govern emerging market debt is usually
specified in the debt contract, along with the parties’ choice of dispute resolution forum.34 Governing law provisions are less common in debt marketed domestically. It is often assumed that the issuer’s own laws, as
interpreted by its own courts, will govern such debt.35 The growth in sovereign debt explicitly or presumptively governed by local law, and its new
prominence in the portfolios of foreign investors, raises two kinds of questions: How would local-law debt contracts perform in crisis? And does the
growth in local-law debt reflect newfound trust in emerging market legal

30. See CHANG ET AL., supra note 3; INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, LIVING
THE RISKS OF SOVEREIGN FINANCE (2006).

WITH DEBT: HOW TO LIMIT

31. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury & Fed. Reserve Bd., Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,
http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). Central banks in the emerging markets are
important buyers of U.S. Treasury securities.
32. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 24.
33. Mody, supra note 2, at 643.
34. BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 128, 135.
35. Reply Brief of Republic of Argentina and Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Republic
of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (No. 91-763), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 262, at
**21–23 (arguing that Argentine legal references in the text of a domestic bond imply a choice of law
and forum).
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systems on the part of investors? This subsection focuses on the former
question; in conclusion, it suggests directions for further study to elaborate
on the latter.
The traditional view of crisis management takes governing law as
proxy for the legal framework in which future financial distress would
unfold. The sovereign borrower is then presumed capable of restructuring
domestic-law obligations unilaterally, using legislative or executive measures to change the terms. Both these assumptions implicitly rely on a view
of financial markets as segmented; both turn out to be problematic.
First, while most courts will respect contractual choice of law and forum made by sophisticated parties, if no explicit choice has been made—as
is often the case in domestic debt—a foreign court may well take jurisdiction after finding a reasonable connection between the transaction and the
forum.36 Where the issue is straightforward payment default, a diligent
investor may well find a sympathetic judge outside the borrowing country
willing to call nonpayment a breach, even under the borrower’s own
laws.37
A 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case at the center of the sovereign debt
canon illustrates the point. The case involved bonods, Argentine-law instruments that had no clear provision for choice of forum or submission to
jurisdiction.38 The plaintiffs were not U.S. residents. Argentina vigorously
protested the United States’ assertion of jurisdiction. But the justices had
no trouble letting New York courts hear the case based on the fact that
bondholders had the option to be paid dollars in New York.39 The case
settled.

36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. IV, ch. 2, introductory note (1987) (describing a trend away from territorial jurisdiction to recognizing a broader range of links); id. § 421 (Jurisdiction to Adjudicate).
37. Cf. German High Court Rules Argentina Must Repay Bondholders, MERCOPRESS (Uru.), July
7, 2007, http://www.mercopress.com/vernoticia.do?id=10866&formato=pdf; Karin Matussek, Argentine Financial Crisis Doesn’t Bar German Suits, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 5, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aCEnnBN.i3x8&refer=news (discussing a
German court decision addressing the effect of Argentine economic emergency legislation under international law).
38. Reply Brief of Republic of Argentina and Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, supra
note 35, at *21.
39. The case turned on the scope of the commercial activity exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). Under this provision, a sovereign is not immune
and can be sued in a U.S. court based on “an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.” Id. The court ruled unanimously that borrowing money was a commercial activity, regardless of
the purpose of the borrowing, and that a default on a bond that could be paid in New York had a sufficiently direct effect in the United States to support jurisdiction. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607, 615–16, 618–19 (1992).
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The legal regime most relevant for managing the next crisis may turn
out to be ex post accidental. This is because judgments against sovereigns
are almost impossible to enforce for lack of attachable assets outside the
borrower’s territory. Therefore, the most relevant court for a creditor seeking to recover may be in a country where she has found a pot of sovereign
gold or, more likely, a payment stream susceptible to interception. This was
the case in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Belgium became the epicenter of sovereign debt litigation. Creditors targeted Belgium because it
was the home of the main clearance and settlement system in the Euromarkets, processing trillions of dollars in payments and securities, including
sovereign issues. In at least two cases against Latin American sovereigns,
Belgian courts were willing to enjoin government payments to new creditors until debt judgment holders got a pro rata share of those payments.40
Wall Street lawyers criticized this reading of New York-law contracts;
mainstream market authorities ultimately preempted it with a Belgian law
shielding Euroclear from injunctions.41 But jurisdiction doctrines continue
to bring into play old-fashioned, mechanical attributes of sovereign debt
issuance (location of the closing, payments, and clearance and settlement
path), which may determine the legal universe in which disputes involving
both foreign- and domestic-law debt will be resolved—often long after
default.
Second, it is not apparent that governments defer to foreign or international tribunals any more than they do to their local courts. After its 2001
crisis, Argentina’s government enacted emergency measures altering domestic financial contracts, including its own.42 It also defaulted on about
one hundred billion dollars in foreign-law debt. It then faced hundreds of
lawsuits worldwide and many more in Argentina. Six years later, many
Argentines who lost out from the emergency measures and sued at home
got partial compensation through direct and indirect channels.43 Foreign
40. See République du Nicaragua v. LNC Investments LLC, No. 2003/KR/334 (Cour d’Appel de
Bruxelles, Neuvième Chambre [Court of Appeals of Brussels, Ninth Chamber] Mar. 19, 2004) (unofficial translation on file with author); LP Elliott Assocs., No. 2000/QR/92 (Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles,
Huitième Chambre [Court of Appeals of Brussels, Eighth Chamber] Sept. 26, 2000) (unofficial translation on file with author); see also Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116 (2000);
Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld 11–12, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No.
96-7916, 2000 WL 1449862 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000).
41. See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635 (2001); Vladimir
Werning, Argentina Debt Restructuring: Belgian Legal Reform Limits the Options of Hold Outs,
EMERGING MARKETS TODAY, Feb. 24, 2005 (on file with author).
42. Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
129, 138–44 (2008).
43. The Republic of Arg., Prospectus (Registration No. 333-117111), at 112–14 (Dec. 27, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm
#108. For example, banks paid the judgments and were later recapitalized by the government. See
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creditors who refused to take part in Argentina’s debt restructuring and
sued abroad have yet to collect a penny.44 The difference may have a lot to
do with the identity of the creditors involved, discussed below. However, it
is worth acknowledging that the choice of foreign law and resort to foreign
fora have yet to bring higher (or any) litigation recovery. After Argentina,
it also makes sense to ask whether and when a government may be willing
to pay creditors to preserve the domestic legitimacy of its own legal system
in financial and political crisis.45 Scores of lawsuits in and outside Argentina are fertile ground for empirical analysis.
In sum, recent growth in domestic-law sovereign debt and foreign investment in it does not mean that governments in distress get to do as they
please. Understanding change requires shifting focus from New York law
and Second Circuit jurisprudence46 to transnational dispute resolution.
Doing so puts the past in a different light: even when New York- and English-law debt dominated, the greatest legal risk for sovereigns came from
the likes of Belgian courts applying New York law,47 New York courts
applying Argentine law,48 and German courts applying public international
law.49 This idiosyncratic path of law-making and payouts has benefited a
few, but on balance may have increased uncertainty about enforcement and
recovery.50 Uncertainty—as distinct from sovereign impunity—may grow
with domestic debt, as more combinations of borrowers, creditors, contract
documentation practices, and national legal regimes come into play. This in
turn may create demand for more standardization ex ante and may boost
FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE
OF CRISES 185–86 (2006) (describing litigation and compensation awards in Argentina).
44. The judge presiding over much of the litigation against Argentina in the Southern District of
New York famously observed, “[s]o the lawsuits, thus far, have not yielded, not only have they not
yielded a hundred cents on the dollar, they have not yielded one cent on the dollar.” Transcript of
Hearing at 18, H.W. Urban GmbH v. Republic of Arg., No. 02-CV-5699, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9668
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006). Judge Griesa’s observation still holds. See also Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser,
Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795, 804–10
(2004) (describing the treatment of domestic and foreign bondholders in Argentina’s last crisis).
45. Spector, supra note 42, at 138–44; STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 43, at 185–
86.
46. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043 (2004); Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights, 30 WORLD ECON. 1491 (2007).
47. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
49. See sources cited supra note 37.
50. Eric Lindenbaum & Alicia Duran, Debt Restructuring: Legal Considerations, EMERGING
MARKETS (Merrill Lynch & Co., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 30, 2000, at 4, available at
http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/n_merrill_debt%20restr.pdf (arguing that litigation against Peru in
Belgium would make a Nigerian debt exchange more difficult); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 10, at 63–
64 (citing an emerging market fund manager blaming the Belgian litigation for uncertain recovery
values in sovereign restructuring).
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the appeal of statutory sovereign bankruptcy or international dispute resolution such as arbitration.51
Beyond crisis management, the rise of domestic-law debt in the
emerging markets offers an opportunity to ask questions about the content
and significance of legal regimes that underpin government borrowing. It is
widely assumed that investors demanded contracts governed by New York
or English law because, in the words of one sovereign debt veteran, “[o]nly
legal systems that have a well-developed law relating to international financial transactions can supply . . . predictability” in contract enforcement.52 Does the fact that Mexico can now finance itself using local-law
instruments much like the U.S. treasuries reflect investors’ judgment that
its legal system can supply predictability, and that it did not in the past? To
what extent is the new interest in Mexican-, Brazilian-, Ukrainian-, and
Ghanaian-law debt a vote of confidence in emerging market legal systems
rather than a reflection of their economic performance, the capital glut, and
miscellaneous technical factors? How does the answer differ from country
to country—at what point, if ever, does confidence in the legal regime help
drive investment in local-law assets? This line of inquiry is more viable
now that governing law has occasionally decoupled from other factors,
such as currency of denomination and residence of the holder.53
A distinct but related set of questions arises in connection with localcurrency borrowing.
B.

Currency

In 2006, J. P. Morgan’s family of emerging market government debt
indices got a new sibling: GBI-EM tracks liquid local-currency government
debt of poor and middle-income countries.54 Market capitalization for the
new index at the start of 2007 was $693 billion, more than twice that of the
older flagship index for foreign-currency debt of the same countries.55
51. Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014833. For a perspective
on the transnational litigation research agenda, see Samuel P. Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation in
the United States: The Emergence of a New Field of Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007).
52. BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 130.
53. But see, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law
Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141 (2004) (pointing out problems with recent attempts to establish
empirically the relationship between law and economic development); Tamara Lothian & Katharina
Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies of Development: Some Views
From Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101 (2003).
54. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 1. The report launching the index observed that “JPMorgan
created the GBI-EM as local instruments enter the mainstream of investors’ decisions.” Id.
55. CHANG ET AL., supra note 3, at 4 (citing GBI-EM Broad market capitalization at $693 billion,
compared to EMBI Global at $299 billion). Narrower indices show a similar relationship: GBI-EM
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GBI-EM is also part of J. P. Morgan’s Government Bond Index (GBI) family, which follows mainstream market government bonds. The two families
were joined at last.
This subsection examines the extent to which new local-currency instruments reflect assumption of emerging market currency risk by the
creditors. Where they do not, it asks whether the resulting arrangements for
sharing currency risk create new vulnerabilities. Put differently, are emerging market borrowers reaping the benefits traditionally associated with
issuing local-currency debt? And are investors and policymakers addressing the risks embedded in the new instruments?
The shift from foreign- to local-currency borrowing has attracted more
policy attention than any other dimension of change. It is easy to see why
currency matters. Local-currency debt is usually nominal to the sovereign
issuer56—its value changes with inflation and can be altered by the debtor
without changing contract terms. Printing money reduces the localcurrency debt burden. It may also raise prices, depress the value of the
currency, and increase the burden of servicing foreign-currency debt. Similarly, an external shock that brings down a currency takes the localcurrency debt burden down with it; the burden of paying foreign-currency
debt goes up. Recent growth in medium- and long-term local-currency debt
and foreign interest in it seems to imply that investors trust emerging market governments to keep their currencies reasonably stable and valuable.57
This apparent link between local-currency debt and faith in government policies requires elaboration. For example, just because an instrument

Global at $468 billion, compared to EMBI+ at $222 billion. Id.; see also DRAUSIO GIACOMELLI,
CLAUDIO PIRON, WILLIAM OSWALD & GRAHAM STOCK, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., LOCAL
MARKETS GUIDE—LATIN AMERICA 4–5 (2007) (citing similar numbers and observing that growth in
domestic government debt is evidence of “enter[ing] mainstream” and “convergence”).
56. Economies where financial assets and liabilities are indexed to inflation are an exception: the
real burden of local-currency debt indexed to prices does not go down as a result of inflation. For an
example of the effects of indexation on local- and foreign-currency debt management, see Luis Óscar
Herrera & Rodrigo O. Valdés, Dedollarization, Indexation and Nominalization: The Chilean Experience (Cent. Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 261, 2004), available at http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/
documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc261.pdf.
57. See Jeanne & Guscina, supra note 20, at 10, 24–26 fig.10 (suggesting that recent history of
hyperinflation constrains governments’ abilities to issue long-term domestic debt). For governments,
promoting stable and valuable currencies includes refraining from printing money and reducing currency mismatches in the economy. The crises of the 1990s brought home the danger of such mismatches. Banks, companies, and governments borrowed dollars because they could not borrow local
currency long-term in the local markets. But their assets and revenues were in local currency. Crisis hit,
assets lost value, debts ballooned, and economies went bankrupt. See generally GOLDSTEIN & TURNER,
supra note 1 (explaining currency mismatches and their implications); Mark Allen, Christoph
Rosenberg, Christian Keller, Brad Setser & Nouriel Roubini, A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial
Crisis (IMF Working Paper, Paper No. 02/210, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2002/wp02210.pdf.
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is denominated in a particular currency does not mean it is paid in it. At
one end of the spectrum, Mexico’s tesobonos were payable in Mexican
pesos but indexed to the U.S. dollar.58 This created a vulnerability not normally associated with local-currency debt: printing more pesos would reduce their value and raise the amount of pesos owed to the creditors. At the
other end of the spectrum, Brazil and Colombia recently launched global
bonds denominated in local currency and payable in U.S. dollars.59 For
both tesobonos and local-currency global bonds, exchange rate risk is separated from payment risk. In Mexico in 1994, investors shifted exchange
rate risk back to the government. In Brazil in 2006, investors took the exchange rate risk, but not the risk of currency controls, since Brazil promised to pay abroad in foreign currency.60 Under the terms of the global
bond, if the real’s value drops relative to the dollar, creditors get fewer
dollars. Payment risk could still materialize under extreme conditions
where no one is willing to sell dollars for reais at any price. The choice of
New York law added to investor comfort.61
Even with instruments denominated and paid in local currency, the
degree to which investors are in fact taking on local risk is uncertain. For
example, in the run-up to Russia’s financial crisis in 1998, foreigners
bought local-currency treasury bills (GKOs) but sought to hedge themselves using forward currency contracts with Russian banks. The banks
promised to deliver dollars in exchange for roubles at a set rate in the future, taking the risk that the rouble would lose value. Market participants
widely assumed that the banks had implicit government backing; the strategy was to shift rouble risk from the foreign investors back to the Russian
government via the Russian banks.62 The move backfired: in crisis, the
government imposed currency controls that caused banks to breach their
forward contracts.63 The experience made foreign investors more wary of

58. See United Mex. States, Annual Report, supra note 11, at D-79 (referencing dollar indexation
of the tesobonos).
59. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 24. This is not a new phenomenon. Debtor-currency bonds payable in creditors’ currencies or gold were common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See 1 EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN
BONDHOLDERS 26–36 (1951).
60. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 23–24.
61. Following a Belgian court decision against Peru, an investment bank report cited legal experts
suggesting that the “time, currency, and most importantly place, of payment established in the fiscal
agency agreement are ‘of the essence.’” Lindenbaum & Duran, supra note 50, at 3.
62. NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS?: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL
CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 59–61 (2004).
63. Id. at 60; STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 43, at 100; Gelpern & Setser, supra
note 44, at 801 (describing the capital controls and Russian bank defaults on currency contracts).
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local counterparties whose willingness to take local risks came with embedded exposure to local institutions.
Investors can increasingly unload currency risk without implicating
local partners by using offshore non-deliverable forward contracts (NDFs).
Like deliverable forwards, NDFs shift exchange rate risk between contract
parties; however, NDFs do not require the actual exchange of one currency
for another. The party that placed the losing bet must deliver only the difference in value, not the full contract amount, to the other side at maturity.
Most NDF trading in emerging market currencies takes place offshore and
is settled in foreign currencies; most of the participants are foreign.64 Today’s NDF markets began with trading in Latin American currencies in the
early 1990s; recently, market and policy attention has shifted to Asia.65
NDF markets embody the dilemma of partial convergence between
emerging and mainstream markets. A typical rationale for their existence
involves restrictions on the ability of foreign and/or local residents to exchange local currency and the often-related dearth of currency hedging
opportunities onshore.66 A floating exchange rate and unrestricted onshore
forward markets should (and did in Australia) obviate the need for offshore
NDF trading. Where onshore and offshore markets exist in parallel—
usually where governments fix or heavily manage the exchange rate—the
relationship between the two can turn contentious.67 Offshore NDF trading
creates hedging options to support demand for local-currency debt, but can
also put pressure on the local currency. Insured domestic institutions trading in NDF markets can compound a government’s liability. Most recently,
NDF trading was blamed for putting pressure on the Thai baht, prompting
the government to ban local banks from participating.68 On the other hand,
64. Most trading is also over-the-counter, subject to minimal regulation. See LAURA LIPSCOMB,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AN OVERVIEW OF NON-DELIVERABLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORWARD
MARKETS (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny5.pdf; Guy Debelle, Jacob Gyntelberg & Michael Plumb, Forward Currency Markets in Asia: Lessons from the Australian Experience,
BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2006, at 53, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0609g.pdf. In theory,
NDF settlement can be onshore or offshore, in local or foreign currency. Australia had an active onshore NDF market in the 1970s and 1980s that disappeared soon after it removed currency controls.
Debelle et al., supra.
65. Andy Mukherjee, Viewpoint, Asian Policy Makers, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sep. 14, 2006, at 19,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/14/bloomberg/sxmuk.php; Postings of Various Commentors to Brad Setzer’s Blog, http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/setser/94845 (Aug. 10, 2005).
66. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 56.
67. See sources cited supra note 65; Debelle et al., supra note 64.
68. See Press Release, Bank of Thailand, Revision of Measures to Prevent Thai Baht Speculation
and Options on Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.bot.or.th/
BOThomepage/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/PressReleases/news2550/Eng/n1350e.htm; Press
Release, Bank of Thailand, Measures to Curb Short-term Capital Inflows (Dec. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.bot.or.th/BOThomepage/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/PressReleases/News2549/Eng
/n4849e.htm.
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onshore regulation can still impact the offshore market: unexpected bank
holidays in Argentina in 2001 and Venezuela in 2003 disrupted NDF trading in their currencies.69
In sum, local-currency bonds in the emerging markets may look much
like their mainstream-market counterparts, but they often come with transactional features that limit the benefits of local-currency borrowing for the
sovereign. The progression from Mexico’s dollar-indexed tesobonos to
Brazil’s local-currency global bonds suggests that eventually investors may
buy local-currency bonds issued by emerging market governments without
simultaneously attempting to offload the currency risk or pass it back to the
borrower. In the interim, Mexican and Russian crises show that contractual
devices to opt out of emerging market currency regimes can obscure the
location of currency risk and create a false sense of security on both sides
of the transaction.
C.

Creditors

More than a dozen emerging economies recently lifted restrictions on
foreign participation in their domestic government bond markets. Meanwhile, emerging market institutions previously limited to holding domestic
securities are buying bonds marketed to foreigners.70 As a result, different
investors have come to hold identical debt instruments. In addition, domestic debt traditionally held to maturity by local institutions is beginning to
trade. This subsection explores the implications of these two developments
for crisis management.
Creditor identity can trump both governing law and currency of denomination in determining government approaches to debt management.
Governments want to know who their creditors are partly to predict how
they would behave and to have a sense at least of the initial allocation of
losses in the event of a debt crisis. Creditors have different risk tolerance,
regulatory constraints, claims on the national treasury, and political connections. For their part, governments’ capacity to influence their own citizens
and foreigners, individuals and institutions, and regulated and unregulated
lenders varies widely.
It is useful to elaborate on aspects of creditor identity that have played
a role in crisis management. Balance of payments statistics turn on creditor

69. Without onshore trading, it was difficult or impossible to value NDF contracts at maturity.
LIPSCOMB, supra note 64, at 5.
70. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–2 (on foreign participation in local markets); GOLDSTEIN
& TURNER, supra note 1, at 96 (on local institutions buying foreign debt).
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residence.71 It is the traditional way of delimiting the national economy—
and the corresponding polity72—from the rest of the world. Capital inflows
are defined as transfers from nonresidents to residents; transfers to nonresidents are outflows. Governments’ decisions to default or restructure are
influenced by the politics of who wins and who loses. Where local residents vote or otherwise influence the government and resident institutions
have a direct claim on the country’s fiscal resources, the residence of the
holder may reflect these concerns.73
Recent restructuring experience confirms this intuition. For example,
Argentine banks and pension funds continued to buy government debt under government pressure long after non-resident institutions had stopped. In
crisis, they accepted local-law instruments rejected by foreigners.74 This
allowed the Argentine government to separate domestic and foreign creditors into different instruments, so that default on foreign-currency, foreignlaw bonds was in the first instance a default on the foreigners.75 Other governments have variously refrained from defaulting on debt held by local
banks and have compensated local residents after default while leaving
foreigners in the lurch. Administrative mandates, regulatory capital treatment, side payments, and good old-fashioned arm-twisting are examples of
debt management tools that governments use more freely and successfully
with local residents.
Using creditor residence as a proxy for creditor preferences and treatment in crisis raises two sets of concerns. First, residence may be either

71. IMF, supra note 19.
72. Allan Drazen, Towards a Political-Economic Theory of Domestic Debt, in THE DEBT BURDEN
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR MONETARY POLICY 159 (Guillermo Calvo & Mervyn King eds., 1998).
Note that although balance of payments statistics imply a polity by defining a relevant space where
economic agents move under government authority, in theory, an economy with residents need not
correspond to any recognized political unit or depend on the recognition of other states. IMF, supra
note 19, ¶¶ 21, 57–64.
73. Drazen, supra note 72 (focusing on interest groups and the domestic/external divide); Alexander Guembel & Oren Sussman, Sovereign Debt Without Default Penalties (Nov. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885434 (arguing that debt default and
restructuring are driven by the preferences of a median domestic voter).
74. The Republic of Arg., supra note 43, at 126, 165–66; STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra
note 43, at 177–78 (describing Phase I/Phase II debt exchange plans); Gelpern & Setser, supra note 44,
at 805–06.
75. See Giselle Datz, Global-National Interactions and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Outcomes,
in DECIPHERING THE GLOBAL: ITS SCALES, SPACES AND SUBJECTS 323, 334, 336–37 (Saskia Sassen
ed., 2007) (on the treatment and behavior of Argentine pension funds in the 2001 crisis). In November
2001, the pension funds along with other Argentine holders agreed to exchange their foreign-law bonds
for Argentine-law, dollar-denominated loans. The government defaulted on the foreign bonds, but not
on the local loans. It then unilaterally redenominated the loans into pesos. The pension funds balked. In
response, the government reinstated the funds’ holdings of foreign-law bonds, which by then were in
default.
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unknowable or misleading.76 Even ignoring the impact of credit derivatives
(discussed in the next subsection), active trading means that a bond may
change hands many times in one day. No reporting system can keep up in
real time. In addition, securities are commonly held through layers of intermediaries for reasons ranging from administrative convenience to tax
evasion. It is often impossible to determine whether a creditor holds a bond
on another’s behalf.77 The simplest example of this is the case of Russia,
with the largest reported foreign resident exposure to local-currency instruments by dollar value ($44.5 billion in September 2006).78 Anecdotal
evidence collected by regulators suggests that most of this debt is held by
offshore Russian investors.79 It is far from clear whether their behavior in
crisis would resemble that of onshore Russians, bona fide foreigners, or
neither.
Second, even if a creditor’s residence were ascertainable, using it
alone may obscure other proxies for creditor behavior. Did Argentine banks
and pension funds, discussed earlier, act the way they did because they
were Argentine, because they were regulated, or because the maturity
structure of their assets differed from that of their liabilities? The answer
must be some combination of the above. Among domestic investors, the
rich may have more influence over their government80 or may be politically
easier to expropriate via domestic debt default.81 Wealthy individuals may
have access to private information and more ways to move capital offshore
in bad times. Local banks may have less leeway in crisis for fear of a run
on deposits; in contrast, pension funds that make no payouts for years may
be more flexible but also more politically expendable in the short run.82
Both banks and pension funds may succumb to pressure from the borrowing government whose priorities shift from prudential regulation to macroeconomic crisis management. On the other hand, deposit insurance and
governments’ reluctance to stiff voting depositors or alienate bank owners
76. This is related to the more general concern, shared by students of the mainstream markets and
discussed below, that the identity of the beneficial owner of an instrument and therefore creditor behavior may be difficult to ascertain at any given time due to active trading, layers of intermediaries, and
credit risk transfer.
77. See Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of N.Y., 58 F. Supp. 2d 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(highlighting the importance of intermediaries and the difficulty of ascertaining beneficial ownership).
78. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 78.
79. Id.
80. Cf. Guembel & Sussman, supra note 73, at 3–4.
81. Michael Kremer & Paras Mehta, James Madison, George Soros, and Feldstein-Horioka:
Disfavored Creditor Groups and Government Debt 31–32 (May 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/miller/esrcproffellows/summer
2007/programme2/kremer_--_globalizationand_publicfinance_07.09.07_notrack.pdf.
82. See Datz, supra note 75, at 334, 336.
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may give banks bargaining leverage that other investors lack. Any of these
factors may become salient in any given crisis; the ways in which they
affect the crisis path and the policy response vary with the context.
Preferences also differ among foreign investors. Again, Argentina is a
rich and pertinent example. Many of the creditors who rejected its debt
restructuring offer (some twenty billion dollars in outstanding principal)
likely were European individuals.83 In contrast, most institutions agreed to
restructure. There were also anecdotal reports of large-scale transfers from
people to hedge funds on the eve of the debt exchange, which may have
made the restructuring possible.84 Among institutions, those that commit to
holding emerging market debt, as well as regulated crossover investors
(such as mainstream pension funds), may seek to avoid volatility. Surveys
suggest that some crossover investors avoid instruments popular with
hedge funds.85
Finally, for many emerging markets there is still the sizable presence
of foreign public (official) creditors. The old official creditors—wealthy
G7 countries and international financial institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank—are receding in importance, thanks to prepayments by
middle-income countries and debt relief for the poorest.86 A different breed
is replacing them: emerging market governments seeking some mix of
policy influence and higher return on their enormous savings.87 China and
oil-exporting economies in the Middle East have attracted the most attention worldwide. In Latin America, the spotlight is on Venezuela, which has
sought to use its oil wealth to expand its economic and political clout in the
region. It stepped into the shoes of the IMF and foreign private creditors to
buy Argentine bonds and has offered financing to Bolivia, Ecuador, and
83. Anna Gelpern, After Argentina 3, 7 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. 05-2,
2005), http://petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf.
84. Bottom-fishers are only happy to buy a bond from an Italian retiree for $0.17 and sell it for
double a week later, even where double may be a fraction of full face value. Active traders, such as
hedge funds, can profit from price volatility. Id. at 7 box 2.
85. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 88. See also IMF, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 74–84 (Apr. 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/01/index.htm.
86. See, e.g., Murilo Portugal, Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Remarks at a Debt Managers Conference (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/020807.htm (citing
examples of governments that have prepaid their debt to the IMF under favorable capital markets
conditions);
IMF,
FactSheet—The
Multilateral
Debt
Relief
Initiative
(MDRI),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2007); The Paris Club, Terms of
Treatment, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/termes-de-traitement (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); The
World Bank, Economic Policy and Debt—(HIPC) The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative, http://www.worldbank.org/hipc (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
87. IMF, supra note 85, at 63, 85; Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for
Greater Transparency and Accountability (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. 07-6, 2007),
available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf.

MASTER_GELPERN_010908 (HP)

166

4/23/2008 2:00:29 PM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 83:1

others. The question with the new batch of public creditors, as with the old,
goes to the political exchange embedded in the debt relationship. If China
or Venezuela is lending to extract cooperation, it may forbear or restructure
more easily in crisis, but, just as the G7 before it, may use financial distress
to secure policy commitments.
The discussion so far suggests that knowing creditor preferences and
the incentives to which they respond is all-important for debtors, creditors,
and international policy makers. Creditor residence has been the traditional
proxy for political voice, as well as the size, strength, and likelihood of a
creditor’s claim on the borrowing government’s resources. However, residence may be unknowable or misleading (as in the case of Russia). While
policymakers increasingly recognize that other aspects of creditor identity
(such as their status as regulated institutions, government agencies, or political pariahs) may turn out to be more important, these are no more ascertainable owing to active trading, layers of intermediaries, and risk transfer.
Preoccupation with creditor identity is not unique to the emerging
markets. The political salience of Asian government holdings of U.S. treasuries is just one example of the same phenomenon in the rich world.88 But
borrowers such as the United States have adjusted to uncertainty from trading. They use surveys, reporting requirements, and other techniques to get a
better sense of who their creditors are—and do not base their debt management on knowing for sure. Unlike the G7, whose domestic debt is freely
traded, emerging market governments traditionally placed much of theirs
with local banks for recapitalization or other domestic policy purposes.89
Such debt was often non-tradable and low-yielding; it was uniquely valuable to the banks because their regulators treated it favorably. The sovereign borrower enjoyed the side benefit of knowing and regulating the bulk
of its creditors. The presence of non-tradable debt in regulated institutions,
described as a sign of market immaturity,90 gave governments more scope
for selective default and disparate treatment of its creditors in distress.91
As regulatory barriers and other transaction costs go down, this pattern
of segmentation is receding:92 liquidity is the new goal, with fewer bespoke
obligations tailored to specific creditor groups, and fewer options for a
88. See, e.g., William Jefferson Clinton, Speech at the Democratic National Convention (July 26,
2004).
89. CGFS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS, supra note 13, at 67–72. This is in large part a
legacy of past crises, which required multiple rounds of bank recapitalization with low-interest, nontradable, local-currency, local-law government bonds.
90. Id.
91. Gelpern & Setser, supra note 44, at 805–06.
92. See supra Section I.
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government seeking to discriminate among them. Where segmentation
persists, creditors that expect to be disfavored in distress (for example,
foreigners) may seek out obligations held by those with more influence (for
example, local banks or the median voter).93 But this strategy is selflimiting: the presence of disfavored creditors dilutes the very influence that
would protect them. Economists argue that with a rising probability of default thanks to the presence of disfavored creditors, borrowing costs could
go up, offsetting or surpassing the savings from greater liquidity.94
The diversity of sovereign debt holders, their intermingling, and the
difficulty of ascertaining their identity evoke two kinds of responses among
policy makers: calls for transparency and administrative restrictions.
Transparency is presumptively good. Governments should gather and
disclose more information on their creditors, as well as their own lending.95
However, calling for investment in transparency demands an acknowledgment of its costs and its limits. Some governments lack resources to ramp
up statistical operations. A G8 “Action Plan” released in May 2007 promised support to develop statistical capacity for local bond markets in the
emerging economies.96 But even as traditionally domestic statistics gain
international significance, wealthy government institutions do not always
agree on what constitutes “domestic” debt, and, therefore, on what information should be gathered about it and why. Coordination among authorities
is critical to achieve consensus on this point before launching new survey
systems.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, no disclosure regime can operate in
real time. Better, wider, and deeper surveys will reveal trends—which can
better inform regulation, debt management, and political debate—but not
who holds the bonds on the eve of default. Precision may have to wait until
the morning after losses fall where they may.
Substantive rules and administrative restrictions, such as making some
instruments off-limits to some investors (foreign governments, ordinary
people, or institutions that hold their savings), are one way to address the
limits of transparency. But governments face competing policy goals when
devising rules of this sort. For example, to protect banks holding people’s
deposits, it makes sense to restrict their investment options and cap their
holdings of risky government debt. On the other hand, if the goal is to
93. See Guembel & Sussman, supra note 733.
94. Kremer and Mehta argue that the result of having favored and disfavored creditors mingled in
the same instruments is a higher probability of default and higher borrowing costs. Kremer & Mehta,
supra note 81, at 5–6.
95. Cf. Truman, supra note 87.
96. See G8 Action Plan, supra note 16.
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maximize sovereign debt management flexibility, local banks make attractive creditors because they are susceptible to regulatory pressure. In practice, time consistency problems abound: governments cap local institutions’
holdings of their bonds in good times, only to bribe or pressure them into
breaching the caps in crisis.97 And absent iron-clad capital controls and
perfect international coordination, some evasion is inevitable.
In sum, the growing diversity of investors in government debt and
more active trading in local bonds make the emerging markets look more
mainstream. But to this day, “domestic government debt” in many countries evokes non-market instruments parked in local banks by some combination of mandate and special accommodation. The ongoing shift away
from this model should prompt governments to rethink the use of creditor
identity as a debt management tool. This is a sign of progress; it also makes
for tough choices in countries that remain vulnerable to financial crises.
Two implications follow. First, governments may be forced to rely less on
their ability to discriminate among creditors and more on making the legal
and financial terms of the debt instrument more flexible.98 Second, with
fewer options to manage creditor composition in advance, restructuring
operations after the onset of financial distress may serve an increasingly
important diagnostic function. At the extreme, a government may have no
choice but to default on all creditors and compensate favored groups after
their losses are ascertained.
D.

Credit Risk

In the mainstream markets, concerns over creditor identity reappear as
concerns over the location of risk in the financial system. Policymakers
who worry about systemic risk have focused on the impact of credit derivatives.99 Without shifting ownership of a debt instrument, a credit derivative
97. Argentina is one example. Pension funds were subject to caps on the order of 50%, which
were flouted in 2001 with the government’s blessing. Thomas V. Ciampi, Help on the Way: Argentina’s
Pension Funds Get Incentives to Buy Bonds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 28, 2001, at 14.
98. See, e.g., INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, supra note 30, at 270–74.
99. See, e.g., Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Remarks at the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) 7th Annual Risk Management
Convention and Exhibition in New York City: Risk Management Challenges in the U.S. Financial
System (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060228.html;
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm. For the
most comprehensive legal treatment to date, see Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and
Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007). The link between concern with creditor
identity and the impact of credit derivatives is most explicit in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g.,
Stephen J. Lubben, Essay: Credit Derivatives & the Future of Chapter 11 (Seton Hall Pub. Law Re-
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contract can create a parallel set of obligations that effectively reconstitute
a portion of the risk embedded in the debt contract. For example, in a credit
default swap (CDS) one party (“protection seller”) agrees to pay the other
(“protection buyer”) the full face value of a bond (“reference obligation”) if
one or more bad things (“credit events,” such as payment default) happen
to the bond or its issuer. The buyer pays a fee and, if it makes a claim, usually delivers the bond.100 Investors use contracts like this, and many more
complex variations,101 to offload credit risk embedded in the instruments
they hold or to take stand-alone market positions without ever holding the
underlying debt.
Credit risk is not a fixed, shared concept but rather a contingent one,
defined by the terms of the transfer contract itself. For example, one CDS
contract may use debt restructuring to trigger the seller’s payment obligation, while another may require bankruptcy or payment default.102 The two
constitute and move different parcels of risk.
Parsing and shifting credit risk can alter creditor incentives. On a large
scale, it can exacerbate the uncertainty about creditor identity and behavior
in distress, and narrow the scope for preemptive measures further along the
lines discussed in the preceding subsection. In this respect, which has received considerable policy and academic attention, the impact of credit
derivatives on mainstream and emerging markets is essentially similar.
This subsection focuses instead on the differences in the way these contracts function in mainstream and emerging markets and asks whether these
differences pose new risks.
Contracts that reference emerging market debt are less than ten percent of the thirty trillion dollar global market in credit derivatives,103 but

search Paper No. 906613, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906613 (arguing that credit
derivatives may undermine the current premise of the U.S. corporate reorganization regime that creditors have economic ownership of their claims against the debtor). For a similar argument in the emerging market sovereign context, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Credit Derivatives and the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process 64–69 (Apr. 27, 2004) (unpublished LL.M. paper, Harvard Law School), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/pierre_verdier.pdf.
100. Physical settlement—delivery of the reference obligation or permitted equivalent—is still
common in the emerging markets; however, cash settlement is on the rise.
101. See e.g., Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology
for Credit Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 541 (2002) (discussing more complex structures for
credit transfer); see also Claire A. Hill, Comment, The Future of Synthetic Securitization: A Comment
on Bell & Dawson, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 563 (2002); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 99; Lubben,
supra note 99 (discussing the implications of complex structures).
102. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bertalanffy, Restructuring Debate Reaches Fed, INT’L FINANCING REV.,
Dec. 2, 2006, at 97 (describing the implications of different credit event definitions for corporate credit
derivatives markets in the United States and Europe).
103. Roger Merritt & James Batterman, Fitch Ratings, Credit Derivatives Update (Mar. 6, 2007),
slides available at http://www.fitchratings.com/dtp/pdf1-07/vcre0306.pdf (citing notional outstanding
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they account for two out of four reported U.S. cases on credit derivatives.104 Emerging market contracts differ from mainstream market contracts in three ways. First, the bulk of emerging market credit derivatives
are basic CDSs. Mainstream markets use more complex structured vehicles
that are still rare in the emerging world.105 Second, the underlying credit is
overwhelmingly sovereign. Most mainstream contracts key off corporate
credit.106 Third, credit derivatives in the emerging markets transfer different risks and often serve very different functions than their mainstream
counterparts. The remainder of this section elaborates on the second and
third distinctions, which were at the heart of recent litigation.
1.

Sovereign Misfits

Citibank chairman Walter Wriston’s famous aphorism to the effect
that states do not go bankrupt107 may have been wrong as a matter of credit
assessment, but remains an astute summary of the sovereign borrowing
predicament. States routinely run short of funds and the political capacity
to pay their creditors. But for states, unlike most borrowers, the moment of
reckoning is inherently political and often self-judging.108 The absence of a
formal bankruptcy framework does not mean that sovereign default is discretionary; it does mean that apart from failure to pay, there is no natural
(insolvency) or formal (bankruptcy) threshold that can serve as a proxy for
extreme credit deterioration.109 This is a problem for contracts that rely on
hard triggers, such as the CDS.
The problem surfaced in a case that turned on the interplay between
domestic and external sovereign debt. In 2001, a New York-based hedge
between twenty-five and thirty trillion dollars in June 2006, with sovereign credits at 4.2 percent of the
total, based on data from the British Bankers Association, BIS and ISDA).
104. For disputes involving emerging market sovereign CDSs, see Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Société
Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007); Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004); and Ursa Minor Ltd. v. Aon Fin. Prods., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2474,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10166 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000). For disputes involving mainstream corporate
CDSs, see Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, 04 Civ. 5594, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45322 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006); In re Enron Corp., 328 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); and In re
Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
105. IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 53 (Apr.
2006), available at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2006/01/index.htm.
106. Id.; DAGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 1–2.
107. Walter B. Wriston, Banking Against Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1982, at A27.
108. On the political character of sovereign debt and its implications, see generally Robert K.
Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159
(2004), and Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2001).
109. The concept of debt sustainability is an analogue to solvency; however, the thresholds are
policy driven (as in official debt relief) and highly contested. See sources cited supra note 86 for World
Bank, IMF, and Paris Club views on debt sustainability in the context of debt relief.
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fund, Eternity Global, bought three CDS contracts on Argentine sovereign
debt from a J. P. Morgan affiliate.110 As Argentina’s credit plummeted, but
before it missed its first debt payment, the government offered to swap
foreign-law, foreign-currency bonds for Argentine-law, dollar-denominated
loans with longer maturity and a much lower interest rate.111 The offer was
technically voluntary, designed to appeal to domestic institutions so as to
segregate them from foreigners and set the stage for more restructuring
operations.112 Eternity was among the few foreign institutions to participate. It then turned to Morgan, claiming that Argentina’s offer was a “mandatory transfer” of the old bonds in exchange for new ones with less
favorable terms, which would trigger a credit event under the CDS contracts. Morgan refused to pay. Eternity sued. The district court in New
York dismissed Eternity’s complaint relying on Argentina’s own (admittedly self-serving) characterization of the debt exchange as voluntary. The
Second Circuit reversed, noting that the contractual definition of restructuring, including “mandatory transfer,” was ambiguous enough for the case to
go forward.113
The impact of the decision went far beyond Eternity’s dispute with
Morgan because CDS contracts are highly standardized. Standardization
underpins the speed and informality that define this vast transnational market: multimillion dollar deals can consummate in minutes over the telephone.114 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
oversees the production of standard terms for most—including credit—
derivative contracts. A court’s interpretation of a standard term can unsettle
market expectations. As the unofficial guardian of this market,115 ISDA
steps in to avert disruption.
110. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 174
(2d Cir. 2004). On the legal features and economic context of the bonds-for-loans exchange, see
STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 43, at 177–78; Gelpern & Setser, supra note 44, at 804–
10; and Setser & Gelpern, supra note 8, at 469.
111. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 43, at 177–78; Gelpern & Setser, supra note 44,
at 805. This exchange was also mentioned in the last subsection. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
112. It is quite plausible that domestic, though not foreign, institutions were pressured into participating. Local institutions also had strong regulatory incentives to participate. STURZENEGGER &
ZETTELMEYER, supra note 43, at 177–78.
113. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 180–82.
114. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Bankers Get Lucky with Clean-Up of Credit Derivatives Trades, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 28, 2006, at 36 (the speed of trading in credit derivatives has raised concerns
about industry documentation practices among U.S. and U.K. regulators).
115. Beyond producing boilerplate, ISDA works to harmonize national legal regimes for derivatives trading to reflect the interests of its membership and has successfully blocked attempts to regulate
over-the-counter swap markets. For ISDA’s role in boilerplate production, see Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139–42 (2006), and Kevin E. Davis, The
Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2006). For critical
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During the Eternity litigation, ISDA convened an expert group to fix
the credit event definitions in standard CDS contracts. The fix replaced
“mandatory transfer” with restructuring “bind[ing] on all” holders of the
reference obligation.116 On its face, the new language replaced a substantive test with a formal one. It eliminated the problem of finding coercion in
a distressed but formally voluntary debt exchange by eliminating coverage
for such exchanges. This was significant because “quasi-voluntary” exchange offers had emerged in the 1990s as the predominant way of managing sovereign debt crises.
Eternity reflects the awkward fit between mainstream market instruments and the emerging market context, and its capacity to make bad law.
The case also sheds light on ISDA’s institutional role in mediating global
financial integration. A quintessentially emerging-market operation—an
exchange designed to separate domestic and foreign holders of distressed
sovereign debt—could not match the mainstream CDS template. The deal
was informal and political: distressed but not bankrupt, and effectively
mandatory for some creditors (local banks) but not others (foreign hedge
funds). As the courts grappled for ways to reflect this complexity in contract interpretation, ISDA’s quasi-legislative response ended the awkwardness by ending coverage for similar deals going forward.
To the extent market participants continue to buy protection for restructuring117 and as the 2003 post-Eternity definitions gain ground,118 they
may change sovereign restructuring practice. Absent sovereign bankruptcy,
creditors facing default will have two basic ways of collecting under a sovereign CDS: getting bound or not getting paid.119 A sovereign that seeks to
analysis of ISDA’s role, see PARTNOY, supra note 23, at 46–47; ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL
KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASON IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, ch. 2 (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with author); Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169,
171, 185–88 (2007).
116. Compare INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 1999 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
DEFINITIONS §§ 4.7(a), 4.9 (1999), with INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT
DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 4.7(a) (2003). See Choi & Gulati, supra note 115 (describing ISDA’s
intervention and making the analogy to legislation).
117. Cf. Bertalanffy, supra note 102. Large segments of the credit derivatives market have dispensed with restructuring as a credit event altogether. This is partly due to the often-ambiguous relationship between credit risk and restructuring out of bankruptcy, but also to the difference in the
composition of market participants in the United States and Europe, and the differences in bank regulatory treatment of credit derivatives between the United States and Europe, which in turn comes from
different approaches to implementing Basel II capital adequacy standards in the two jurisdictions.
118. In late 2003, almost all sovereign CDSs used the 1999 definitions of “restructuring”; by then,
close to half of bank and corporate CDSs had adopted substantially modified restructuring clauses.
Packer & Suthiphongchai, supra note 23, at 83–84.
119. Eternity illustrates how credit derivatives can change incentives. Having bought protection,
Eternity may have been moved to act “out of character”—more like local banks than like foreign
funds—joining in the domestic exchange because it thought it had little to lose. In addition, the CDS
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restructure against the background of a large stock of CDSs may come
under pressure to declare a moratorium, stop paying, use local law to impose new terms on its creditors, or use contract provisions that allow a
creditor majority to impose new terms on a dissenting minority. Default
can trigger massive economic disruption.120 As noted earlier,121 restructuring by fiat can undermine confidence in the legal system—though recent
research suggests that the risk may be worth taking.122 The 2003 definitions
may give fresh impetus to the remaining option, using majority rule to cram
down new terms.
2.

Country Risk and Basis Risk

The Second Circuit’s lucid discussion of how credit derivatives work
made Eternity an instant textbook classic in mainstream corporate and international finance.123 One aspect of the incident has received little attention: Eternity appears to have bought CDSs on foreign-law, foreigncurrency Argentine sovereign bonds to hedge country risk on a portfolio of
local corporate and sovereign debt.124 If so, it engaged in a common practice.
Unlike insurance, credit derivatives can be used either to hedge or to
take stand-alone market positions with no other exposure to the reference
credit. But in the emerging markets, they often play an in-between role.
This is because the available hedging instruments—straight CDS contracts
on foreign-currency, foreign-law sovereign debt—lag behind the proliferating investment opportunities in local-currency, local-law sovereign and
corporate debt. An investor holding a General Motors (GM) bond may buy
a CDS on a GM bond; an investor in a bond issued by GM’s joint venture
partner AvtoVAZ125 must usually settle for a CDS on Russian sovereign
mechanism potentially introduces new players with an interest in the restructuring outcome: protection
buyers who are not also creditors of the government, for whom a credit event brings pure gain. Since a
sovereign debtor generally does not know who holds protection and on what terms, the authorities could
find it harder yet to design a pre-default restructuring to accommodate new creditor behavior.
120. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 62, at 305–07 (emphasizing domestic constraints in governments’ decisions to default).
121. Supra Section II A.
122. Charles Calomiris, Devaluation with Contract Redenomination in Argentina (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12644, 2006) (demonstrating significant domestic investment
benefits from Argentina’s unilateral modification of local-law contracts).
123. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 30–39 (5th
ed. Supp. 2005); PAUL B. STEPHAN, JULIE A. ROIN & DON WALLACE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 85–106 (3d ed. Supp. 2007).
124. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 171
(2d Cir. 2004).
125. Cf. WILL OSWALD & SAHZAD HASAN, J.P. MORGAN SEC. INC., RELATIVE VALUE
COMMENTARY: RUSSIA CDS UNDERPERFORMANCE: EM CORPORATE RISK BEING HEDGED VIA
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Eurobonds. A recent investment bank report observed that market participants routinely “hedge” exposure to Russian corporate credit with sovereign CDS contracts.126 To the extent hedging implies a view that Russian
corporate and sovereign risks move in tandem, one need only recall the
demise of Yukos Oil to worry.127 Similar concerns arise when contracts on
foreign-currency sovereign debt are used to hedge against default on localcurrency sovereign debt,128 although the gap between offsetting elements in
the hedging strategy (“basis risk”) may be smaller.
The nature and magnitude of basis risk in the emerging markets has
two sets of implications: one for economists, another for lawyers. First,
while economists look to mainstream CDS prices as proxies for the market
view of the underlying credit risk, emerging market CDS prices may not
convey the same information if a large portion of them is used for country
risk insurance (and very partial insurance at that).129 Second, basis risk can
make bad law when mainstream market instruments and norms combine
with emerging market facts. Another Second Circuit case illustrates.
The Asian Financial Crisis reached its destructive peak in 1998.130 As
cranes froze across the region, a Philippine company procured a one-year
nine-million-dollar loan to build a condo tower.131 The lender, an affiliate
of U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns, got a ten-million-dollar surety bond
from the state-owned Philippine Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS).132 Bear Stearns also bought a CDS contract on the surety bond
from Aon, a U.S. investment fund that helped arrange the underlying loan
for the Philippine developer. Aon would pay Bear Stearns ten million dolSOVEREIGN CDS 7 (2007) (on file with author) (observing the dearth of liquid Russian corporate CDSs
and its implications). For information on the GM-AvtoVAZ joint venture, see General Motors, GMAvtoVAZ, http://www.gm-avtovaz.ru/new_en/inside.php?page=contents/company&model=it7 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2007). For AvtoVAZ bond issuance, see ABTOBA3 [AvtoVAZ], Aktsioneram i
investoram: Tsennye Bumagi [To Shareholders and Investors: Securities], http://www.ladaauto.ru/floater.xml (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
126. OSWALD & HASAN, supra note 125, at 7.
127. The Russian government effectively expropriated Yukos Oil and jailed its owner while the
Russian economy was enjoying record fiscal and external surpluses and prepaying its debts. See In re
Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 401–03 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
128. See, e.g., PAUL FAGE, CREDIT SUISSE, EMERGING MARKETS FIXED INCOME STRATEGY: EM:
DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO HEDGE LOCAL CURRENCY POSITIONS WITH CDS? (2007) (on file with author).
129. Cf. Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing Political Risk,
38 VA. J. INT’L L. 293 (1998) (analyzing the use of asset securitization to reduce political risk, using
examples from cross-border project finance).
130. See, e.g., BLUSTEIN, supra note 27, at 207–10.
131. Ursa Minor Ltd. v. Aon Fin. Prods., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2474, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10166, at
**3–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000). The transaction was conceived in 1998 and consummated in early
1999.
132. Id.
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lars if GSIS did not.133 As far as Bear Stearns were concerned, they had
offloaded the Philippine developer’s credit risk onto GSIS or, at worst, onto
Aon.
Aon sought to protect itself with a CDS on Philippine government
debt, which it bought from Société Générale (SocGen), a French bank.134 It
is unclear whether Aon thought it had passed GSIS’s credit risk on to
SocGen, or simply bet that the parastatal would not default so long as the
Philippine Republic was servicing its foreign bonds. Aon charged Bear
Stearns almost $100,000 more for bespoke protection against default by
GSIS than it paid SocGen for a generic sovereign CDS.135 Aon remained
exposed to the gap between Philippine sovereign credit risk and that of
GSIS.
The developer soon defaulted and GSIS disowned the surety bond.
Bear Stearns turned to Aon. Aon first tried to get out of paying Bear
Stearns, but lost.136 Aon then went to SocGen. SocGen refused to pay on
the grounds that GSIS was not its problem and Philippine sovereign debt
was doing just fine. Aon sued and won—at first. The district court ruled
that its transactions with Bear Stearns and SocGen should be treated as a
single financing package.137 It also suggested that default by GSIS was
tantamount to Philippine sovereign default, even though Aon did not ask
the government for money until after its contract with SocGen had expired.138
The court appeared to read the SocGen CDS as an instance of mainstream market hedging practice and took basis risk out of the deal. Put differently, it perceived an industry norm (back-to-back CDS contracts
function as credit insurance) and assumed that contracting parties had intended to give effect to the norm.139 If the court had recognized that the
case was about the gap between credit and country risk in the emerging
markets, it may have deduced a different norm and ruled differently.

133. Id. at **6–8.
134. Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2007).
135. Id.
136. Ursa Minor Ltd., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10166, at **18–29.
137. See Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, No. 00 Civ. 5863, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2719, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005), rev’d, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007).
138. Id. at **15–21.
139. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law]; Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) (arguing that judicial reliance on industry
custom is usually misplaced and would undermine the informal order, which relies on judicial enforcement of contracts as written).
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In the event, ISDA submitted its first-ever amicus brief on credit derivatives in support of SocGen’s appeal.140 It argued for a narrow interpretation of CDS terms and asked that Aon be punished among other things
for failing to follow contractual settlement formalities.141 Aon lost badly in
the second round. The Second Circuit’s reversal went to great lengths to
address each of ISDA’s concerns. The effect of the ruling was to endorse
the view that the heavily norm-based credit derivatives market depended
for its survival on strict judicial enforcement of its contracts as written.142
In an ironic twist, ISDA’s role in the Aon saga evokes the role of the
U.S. government in sovereign debt litigation since the 1980s. For example,
the United States intervened midway in a famous trilogy of cases involving
the government of Costa Rica, arguing for a narrow interpretation of the
debt contract after a court sought to imply cooperative sovereign debt restructuring norms from U.S. efforts to manage the crisis.143 Several years
later, the United States intervened again, this time on the side of Brazil,
deploying a similarly formalist argument against a creditor.144 Like ISDA,
the U.S. government has repeatedly argued for a strict separation between
judicial contract enforcement and policy-driven, norm-based crisis resolution. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government spoke as an institutional
guarantor of the nascent market in emerging market sovereign debt; in
2006, ISDA played a similar quasi-public role in the global market for
credit derivatives. By advocating judicial formalism, both guarantors preserved their own respective dominance in the norms realm.
In sum, much like the changes discussed earlier, the rapid growth of
credit derivatives could make resolving the next emerging market financial
140. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. in Support of
the Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007)
(No. 06-1080-CV).
141. Id. at 11–20; cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981) (classic argument for judicial formalism in interpreting relational contracts).
142. See Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007). This is not necessarily a contradiction. In Lisa Bernstein’s terms, this is an argument that “relationship-preserving norms”
in an industry where participants routinely compromise to avoid litigation depend on strict enforcement
of formal “end-game” norms that come into play in litigation. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law,
supra note 139, at 1780, 1780 n.217. Cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 141; Deutsche Bank AG v.
AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, 04 Civ. 5594, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45322, at **38–41 (S.D.N.Y. July
6, 2006) (enforcing strict compliance with deadlines specified in the CDS contract after describing the
plaintiff’s failed attempts to invoke relationship-preserving norms to settle the dispute).
143. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curae at 4, 6–7, Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.1985) (No. 83-7714). For excellent historical analysis, see
Pérez & Weissman, supra note 7, at 738–45. See also James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign
Loan Contracts and its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2006).
144. Statement of Interest of the United States of America in Opposition to the First Amended
Complaint at 9, CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (94 Civ. 4733).
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crisis more complicated. Creditors will act differently where the goal is to
get paid in full under a sovereign CDS, rather than to collect in part from
Argentina. Governments may not know for sure who their creditors are
until after the protection buyers have collected and have handed over the
sovereign IOUs to the protection sellers. Without a bankruptcy backstop,
this process could be long, traumatic, and politically contentious. In this
respect, the difference between the impact of credit derivatives on emerging and mainstream markets would be one of degree. But quite apart from
adding to complexity and uncertainty, credit derivatives—like domestic
debt—often serve different functions in emerging and mainstream markets.
And where contracts purporting to move credit risk are used to hedge country risk, they are more likely to break down. Since many emerging market
sovereign CDSs are standard-form New York-law contracts between rich
country institutions, a court might easily miss the difference, with consequences for the broader markets.
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF CONVERGENCE
At this writing, mainstream financial markets are reeling from failures
that have a distinctly emerging market feel: overborrowing, a lack of transparency, vanishing trust in institutions, and regulatory incapacity to keep
up with market sophistication. Emerging market economies, with their
abundant surpluses and reserves, are today’s “safe havens.”145 “Convergence” and market “maturity” look like increasingly elusive ideals. Global
financial integration has gone from clichéd prophesy to messy reality.
This symposium contribution has attempted to map a piece of this reality, the changed world of emerging market sovereign debt. Recent growth
in local-currency, local-law instruments and risk transfer machinery from
NDFs to CDSs all seem to suggest that middle-income and poor countries
are becoming more like the rich. However, a closer look reveals that the
picture of steady progress to a fixed goal of market maturity is flawed. This
essay has focused on instances of incomplete convergence, where formally
similar instruments are used differently in different markets.
Examples in the text suggest that the appearance of convergence carries its own risks. Local-currency debt where creditors shed all or part of
the currency risk, bonds designed for local banks that move into the hands
of foreign funds, and credit derivatives that function as country risk insurance can upset the expectations of policymakers and market participants,
145. Jerome Booth, Emerging Market Debt is the New Safe Haven, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Aug. 29,
2007, at 22.
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and cause or exacerbate the effects of default. In cases like Eternity and
AON, the gap between emerging market facts and mainstream market instruments can drive lawmaking on financial innovation.
For the emerging markets, there are risks in shrinking the space to
manage sovereign distress before default. Where creditor identity, location
of currency risk, and the relevant legal regime for debt collection are not
knowable in advance, pre-emptive restructurings are hard to design. There
are risks for everyone in the proliferation of legal and currency regimes
relevant to financial stability. These may prompt demands for centralized
solutions, or at least for greater standardization.
One lesson from recent events is the need to define “domestic debt”
more precisely. Policymakers and market participants using the term often
talk past one another. Statistics gathering is inconsistent across countries
and institutions. This essay suggests that each dimension of change—
governing law, currency, and creditor identity, to name a few—implicates
different actors, different risks, and a different line of policy inquiry. This
does not mean that the authorities should abandon surveys based on any
one of the dimensions. It does mean that the consequences of using law
over residence, or residence as a proxy for currency, should be recognized
and made explicit.
In addition, the decoupling of governing law, currency, and creditor
identity in emerging market sovereign debt offers an opportunity to ask
new questions about the relevance of legal regimes for attracting capital,
and about the viability of existing governance structures for exchange rates
and currency markets. Local-law debt may or may not stand for trust in
emerging market legal systems, just as local-currency debt need not stand
for broad-based sharing in local-currency risks.
The emerging markets are neither marginal nor mainstream—and the
mainstream itself is no longer fixed or insulated from the periphery. Locating, managing, and exploiting the gaps and failures of convergence are key
challenges for students and practitioners of global governance. The task is
technically complex, politically fraught, and unavoidable.

